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TORT REFORM-LIMITATION ON RECOVERYTHE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 3333.2
OF CALIFORNIA'S MEDICAL COMPENSATION REFORM ACT

Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985),
appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985)

INTRODUCTION

Between 1960 and 1970 premiums for medical malpractice insurance increased dramatically.' The cause of this increase seems

to be twofold. While they do not totally agree on the degree of
responsibility, industry spokesmen claim the two major causes

of this increase are economic effects on the insurance industry
and the increasing frequency and size of malpractice claims.'
Over the years, technological advances in medicine have been
remarkable and highly publicized. These advances have led the

public to think every medical procedure should go exactly as
planned. If it does not, then negligence must be involved. 3 Ironically, advanced scientific and medical technology has, in some
areas, increased the likelihood of human error and negligence'

because of the heightened risk of many of the new procedures. 5
In 1975, the California Legislature reacted to the malpractice
insurance crisis6 by enacting the Medical Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA).' The purpose of MICRA was to "reduce the costs

1. Reddish, Legislative Response to the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis: ConstitutionalImplication,
55 TEX. L. REv. 759, 759-60 (1977).
2. Waxman, Spiraling Costs: A Health Care Slide, TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 23.
3. Wecht, Medicine: A Commercial Enterprise?, TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 39.
TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 32, 33.
4. Frink, The Twain Must Meet Or.....
5. Bernzweig, Getting to the Root of the Health Problem, TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 58, 59.
6. Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis"in Perspective, 3 W. ST. U.L. Rev. 27 (1975).
7. Ch. 1, Sec. 1, 1975 Cal. Stats.2d Ex. Sess. 3949.
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which underlie... [the] insurance premiums"8 in order to ensure an adequate supply of health providers and a reasonable system of recovery for those injured by medical malpractice. 9 The
legislature was attempting to balance the interests of physicians,
insurance companies, injured patients and society." ° To help accomplish these goals MICRA limited recovery for noneconomic
losses due to medical malpractice." California Civil Code Section 3333.2k" "distinguishes between those tort claimants whose
injuries were caused by medical malpractice and all other tort claimants. The statute also distinguishes between medical malpractice victims whose non-economic loss exceeds $250,000 and those
whose non-economic loss is $250,000 or less."" A question thus
arises: does Civil Code Section 3333.2 deny a medical malpractice plaintiff equal protection under the U.S. Constitution?
8. Proclamation by the Governor, 1975 Cal. Stats.2d Ex. Sess. 3947. The proclamation states in part:
The cost of medical malpractice insurance has risen to levels which many physicians and surgeons find intolerable. The inability of doctors to obtain such insurance at reasonable rates
is endangering the health of people in this State, and threatens the closing of many hospitals.
The longer term consequences of such closings could seriously limit the health care provided
to hundreds of thousands of our citizens.
In my judgment, no lasting solution is possible without sacrifice and fundamental reform.
It is critical that the Legislature enact laws which will change the relationship between the
people and the medical profession, the legal profession and the insurance industry, and thereby reduce the costs which underlie these high insurance premiums
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Proclamation].
9. Ch. 2, Sec. 12.5, 1975 Cal. Stats.2d Ex. Sess.
4007. The preamble to MICRA states:
The Legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in the State of California
attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and resulting in a potential breakdown
of the health delivery system, severe hardships for the medically indigent, a denial of access
for the economically marginal, and depletion of physicians such as to substantially worsen
the quality of health care available to citizens of this state. The Legislature, acting within the
scope of its police powers, finds the statutory remedy herein provided is intended to provide
an adequate and reasonable remedy within the limits of what the foregoing public health safety considerations permit now and in the foreseeable future [hereinafter Preamble].
10. Proclamation, 1975 Cal. Stats. 2d Ex. Sess. 3947.
11. See generally Review OfSelected 1975 California Legislation, Torts: Medical Malpractice, 7 PAc. L.J.
544 (1976) for a complete discussion of the Act.
12. California Civil Code Section 3333.2 reads in part:
a)In any action for injury against a health care professional for negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damages.
b)In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000).
CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985).
The California Business and Professional Code defines professional negligence as:
a negligent act or omission to act by the health care provider in the rendering of professional
services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of personal injury or wrongful death,
provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed
and which are not within any restrictions imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. Con § 6146(3) (West Supp. 1983).
13. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 929, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980).
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FACTS

Lawrence Fein brought an action against Permanente Medical
Group for its failure to predict his heart attack. Testimony on Fein's
behalf by Dr. Harold Swain, the head of Cardiology at CedarsSinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, revealed that the heart attack killed a large portion of Fein's heart muscle and reduced his
future life expectancy by approximately "one-half, to about 16
or 17 years." 4 If Fein had been properly diagnosed and treated
his life expectancy would have been decreased by only 10 to 15
per cent.1 "
Permanente Medical Group presented evidence indicating: (1)
that additional medical tests such as an EKG would not have indicated that a heart attack was imminent; (2) that due to the disease in his coronary arteries Fein's heart attack could not have
been prevented; and (3) that, given the condition of Fein's diseased arteries, the heart attack had not reduced Fein's life expectancy by one-half as Swain suggested. 6
The jury returned a verdict in Fein's favor. It included $500,000
for non-economic damages. Permanente Medical Group requested
that the court modify the award pursuant to the provision of
MICRA, Civil Code Section 3333.2, which placed a $250,000
limit on non-economic damages. The trial court reduced the noneconomic damages to $250,000.17
Fein appealed from the judgment."5 He asserted "that the judgment in his favor should be affirmed [and] that the court erred
in upholding the $500,000 MICRA provision at issue here." 9 The
Supreme Court of the United States tacitly upheld MICRA by
refusing to hear Fein v. PermanenteMedical Group on the ground
that it did not present a substantial federal question. 0 Justice Byron White, the sole dissenter and only member of the Court to
explain his vote, based his dissent on the unresolved issue in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. " In Justice
14. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 145, 695 P.2d 665, 670, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368,
373 (1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 145-46, 695 P.2d at 670-71, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
18. Id. at 146, 695 P.2d at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374. While both parties appealed the decision, this note
deals only with Fein's challenge of the constitutionality of Civil Code Section 3333.2.
19. Id. at 146, 695 P.2d at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
20. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
21. Duke Power Co. v. Caroline Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 (1978) (The unresolved issue
iswhether "due process requires a legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the
common law . . .it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be." 106 S. Ct. at 216).
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White's opinion "given the continued national concern over the
'malpractice crisis,' it is likely that more states will enact similar
types of limitations and that the issue will recur.""

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY: AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

Standards of Review
The fourteenth amendment prohibits legislation or other action
which would "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."" "Traditional equal protection analysis
has generally employed two standards of review: the so-called
'two-tier' approach."" The first tier in the standard of review is
the strict scrutiny test. The second is the mere rationality test.
Under the strict scrutiny test, the legislative classification is analyzed to determine if the classification infringes upon a fundamental right" or is based on a suspect classification 6 such as race."
If the classification infringes upon either of these interests, "the
state bears the burden of establishing that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law in question and that the distinctions
drawn are necessary to further that legislative purpose."26 As a
result, legislation which is subjected to the strict scrutiny test is
usually found to be unconstitutional. "
22. Fein, 106 S. Ct. at 216 (White, J., dissenting).
23. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Note, California's Medical Insurance Compensation Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 829, 859 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Challenge].
25. Id. at 860-61. ("The United States Supreme Court has limited the category of fundamental rights to
those 'explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution' " such as "interstate travel, privacy, voting in
state elections, marriage and procreation, and first amendment rights."). See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55 (1982) (the right of interstate travel); Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (the right to
make decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and family relationships without unjustified
government interference); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976) (the right to privacy); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (the right to education); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) ("right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the
jurisdiction").
26. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 860 ("The United States Supreme Court has held that suspect classifications are those that discriminate against classes of persons on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin."). See D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, I I Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974);
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
27. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 866, 555 P.2d 399, 406 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977).
28. Walker & Shaffer, The Constitutionality of California Civil Code Section 3333.2, 7 W. ST. U. L. REV.
39, 44 (1979) [hereinafter Walker & Shaffer, Constitutionality].
29. Note, The Price of Health Care Availability: The Economics of Medical Malpractice, 11 Sw. U.L. REv.
1371, 1392 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Economics].
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California courts have held a victim's right to compensation to
be an important state interest, but the California Supreme Court
has explicitly held that this right to sue is not a fundamental interest. For this reason, it is inappropriate to employ the strict scrutiny analysis when testing MICRA under the equal protection
doctrine. "
Once the legislation has been determined not to be subject to
the strict scrutiny analysis, it is examined under the mere rationality standard of review. 1 A summary of the mere rationality test
is found in McGowan v. Maryland.32 The mere rationality test
"raises a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the legislation under review. The burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the classification by this test is on the challenging
party."33 The courts applying the mere rationality test generally
reject equal protection challenges."
An intermediate standard of review for equal protection, the
means-focus test, has been applied to medical malpractice legislation." The means-focus test determines "whether the legislative means substantially furthers some specifically identifiable
legislative end."" The rationale of the means-focus test is that,
while the right to recover for personal injuries is not a "fundamental
right it is nevertheless an important substantive right" ' and is
"sufficiently important to require that the restrictions imposed on
those rights be subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny"38
than applied using the mere rationality test. Five general types
of intermediate review have been suggested. 9 A common thread

30. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 861-63.
31. Id. at 861; Walker & Shaffer, Constitutionality, supra note 28, at 66.
32. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
33. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 864. See D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d I,
17, 520 P.2d 10, 22, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 798 (1974).
34. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 864.
35. E.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977).
36. Jones, 97 Idaho at 867, 555 P.2d at 407.
37. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931-32, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980) (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830.
39. 1) The objectives served must be "important" although not "compelling."
2) Finding a "close fit" or substantial relationship between the legislation and the objective invoked as a defense.
3) Refusal "to supply a challenged rule with a rationale, drawn from judicial imagination or even from the
rule's history, where the rationale is not advanced in the litigation in the rule's defense."
4) Where there are "convincing reasons to believe the objective is supplied purely by hindsight" the objective
should be given no credit as a defense.
5) Requiring "the legal scheme under challenge be altered so as to permit rebuttal in individual cases even
if the scheme is not struck down altogether."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082-85 (1978).
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is the necessary balancing of the interests of the state against the
interests of the medical malpractice victim.

Balancing of Interests
The state's interest in MICRA is well summarized in California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge. ' Through the enactment of MICRA, the
California Legislature sought to preserve the health care system
reducing rising malpractice premiums. Critics of this legislation
claim that the act was designed to placate physicians. The legislature had a broader concern: balancing the interests of the health
care industry and of society in general.
The interest of the medical malpractice victim is balanced against
the state's interest. The victim's interest covers two basic areas:
the victim's right to recover for damages and the victim's ability
to obtain competent counsel.

The Victim's Right to Recover for Damages
For the first iniquity it is instructive to look at a few recent cases
from various jurisdictions. In Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center"1 , the Iowa Supreme Court recently reduced the verdict awarded William Rudolph, a 40-year-old university professor
"who maintained an athletic lifestyle and routinely engaged in tasks
requiring manual strength, dexterity and fine motor skills"" from
$553,725.8843 to $538,717.60. 4' Rudolph's injury apparently occurred when "hospital employees permitted [his] head to drop sharply backward while transferring him from a hospital cart to his
bed after surgery." His physician was not notified for several
hours. 46 The Supreme Court found that "[a]lithough [Rudolph] has
been able to resume teaching and many of his other prior activities, tasks which were once routine have become difficult or impossible. 4 ' Although the grounds on which the award was allowed
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 933-36.
Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W. 550 (Iowa 1980).
Id. at 560.
Id.at 553.
Id. at 561.
Id.at 553.

Id.

47. Id. at 560.
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are not absolutely clear, they do not appear to include a significant amount, if any, for pecuniary losses. Rudolph's award would
not have been allowed in California. 8
Herman v. Milwaukee Children's Hospital9 dealt with a tenyear-old girl who underwent surgery "to correct idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura, or a tendency to bleed."" Several hours after surgery the child went into shock caused by internal bleeding. 1
Although symptoms indicative of shock were noted at 2:00 a.m.,
it was over an hour later before the first units of blood were administered. 2 The girl's I.Q. was reduced from 100 or 110 to "approximately 85, or 'dull normal.' ""' The child also developed
"epilepsy, weakness in her left arm and leg, and reduced bone
growth in her left leg .... [She] is aware that she is now a different
person than she was before the injury." ' Herman's parents brought
a negligence action against the Milwaukee Children's Hospital for
the injuries suffered by Regina. A jury awarded the child
"[$]2,609,000 for past and future pain and suffering and disability and $281,917 for future loss of earning capacity."" The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found the "$2.6 million award excessive"'
because the award was "three times as large as the largest amount
which [her] counsel suggested would be fair and reasonable..
7
Also, the "award [was] one for pain, suffering and disabili. 9
ty." 8 The court did not find the disability to warrant such a large
award since the child could still perform many normal day-today activities.59 The court "determine[d] that a reasonable and fair
award for Regina's past and future pain, suffering, and disability
would be $925,000." ° It did not disturb awards totaling $631,917
for other damages in this case.6 1 The other damage awards probably would be allowable in California, but the award of $925,000
would fall before MICRA, notwithstanding the court's finding that
48. This case contained an interesting dissent by Chief Justice Reynoldson. Reynoldson would have declared
Medical Malpractice Act 16, relied on by the majority in its reduction of the verdict unconstitutional "on the
ground that it creates three distinctive levels of irrational classification." Id. at 561.
49. Herman v. Milwaukee Children's Hosp., 121 Wis. 2d 531, 361 N.W.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1984).
50. Id. at 531, 361 N.W.2d at 299.
51. Id. at 538-40, 361 N.W.2d at 299-300.
52. Id. at 539-40, 361 N.W.2d at 300.
53. Id. at 540, 361 N.W.2d at 300.
54. Id. at 540-41, 361 N.W.2d at 300.
55. Id. at 541, 361 N.W.2d at 301.
56. Id. at 547, 361 N.W.2d at 304.
57. Id.
58. Id., 361 N.W.2d at 303.
59. Id.
60. Id., 361 N.W.2d at 304.
61. Id. at 548, 361 N.W.2d at 304.
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"nothing in the record leads us to believe that the award [of $2.6
million] or the verdict as a whole was perverse."6
Walters v. Hitchcocl6 ' arose after Lillian Walters, a 32-yearold mother of four, learned of a lump on her neck, and entered
the hospital for a "relatively low risk procedure with an anticipated three-day hospital stay and a small residual scar."" During
surgery Walters' esophagus was cut; it became necessary to sew
the esophagus shut."5 "Numerous hospitalizations and surgical
procedures followed."6 Walters sued her surgeon for negligence.
A jury awarded her $2,000,000 in damages and the surgeon appealed.67
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the $2,000,000 damage verdict notwithstanding: (1) Walters' "medical bills by the time of
trial were approximately $59,000;""' (2) Walters made no claim
for "lost wages or diminished future earning capacity as [she] was
not employed during the course of her 19-year marriage;69 and
(3) "no further surgery.., was contemplated [nor any] evidence
[was] . . .presented regarding future medical expenses."' In
California the award would have been drastically reduced to the
noneconomic damage limitation of $250,000 or less.
On March 9, 1979, Roderick Williams was born. He is "a profoundly retarded, brain damaged spastic quadriplegic, deaf and
almost totally blind."71 Williams' mother brought suit on his behalf claiming that his injuries were the result of negligent predelivery care. The trial court found the medical personnel involved
in the birth negligent in the performance of their duties. It awarded
damages of $500,000.72 The award was limited to $500,000 by
a Louisiana statute ' which resembles MICRA in its effect on the
medical malpractice victim. The Louisiana Court of Appeals
adopted the trial court's holding as its own."' In commenting on
this limitation the court "acknowledge[d] that this approach is blunt
and crude. Plaintiffs ...will be denied legally cognizable damages
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 547, 361 N.W.2d at 304.
Walters v. Hitchcock, 237 Kan. 31, 697 P.2d 847 (1985).
Id. at 31-32, 697 P.2d at 848.
Id. at 32, 697 P.2d at 849.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 37, 697 P.2d at 852.

Id.
Id.
Williams v. Lallie Kemp Charity Hosp., 428 So. 2d 1000, 1003 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
72. Id. at 1003, 1006, 1012.
73. LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 40:1299.39B (West 1977).
74. Williams, 428 So.2d at 1007.
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after having followed strict standards of proof in making out their
claims.""5 The court stated that because of the statutory limitation "it is not necessary to enumerate the exact amount that the
plaintiff would have been awarded absent such a limitation. If [sic]
suffices to say that the damages for pain and suffering and disability added to the loss of future earnings equal an amount well
over $500,000." '
An athletic university professor in the prime of life," a mentally and physically normal ten-year-old girl,' 8 and a 32 year-oldmother with four minor children" - all victims of medical malpractice - are spared the imposition of a "cap" on their damage
award, because they live in a jurisdiction without MICRA-type
legislation. One commentator made a good summary of the rationale underlying "cap" laws: "By placing a ceiling on physician
liability, legislatures have expanded the physician entitlement to
injury and limited the patient's entitlement to bodily integrity."80

The Malpractice Victim's Ability to Secure Counsel
A limitation on the amount of recovery in a malpractice action
also limits the earnings of the victim's attorney. The decision facing
attorneys in jurisdictions with "cap" laws is whether to take a medical malpractice case, in which damages are limited, or to take
a personal injury case not involving medical malpractice that would
not have this limitation.
Assume an infant who, as a result of an injury, is partially paralyzed yet healthy enough to be expected to live another 65-70
years, institutes a suit in a jurisdiction with a "cap" law. If the
injury is a result of medical malpractice the victim's noneconomic damage award will be limited by statute. If the injury has been
otherwise caused, as in an automobile accident, the noneconomic damage award would not be limited by statute. Many attorneys working on a contingent fee basis would accept the accident
case but turn down the malpractice action. In such a case the "cap"
law would tend to reduce the pool of available attorneys for the
victim.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1012-13 (emphasis added).
Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980).
Herman v. Milwaukee Children's Hosp., 121 Wis.2d 531, 361 N.W.2d 297 (1984).
Walters v. Hitchcock, 237 Kan. 31, 697 P.2d 847 (1985).
Note, Economics, supra note 29, at 1404.
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Backgroundand History of EqualProtectionand the Means-Focus
Test
The first State Supreme Court decision invalidating medical malpractice limitations on constitutional grounds, 8 and one of the most
publicized,82 is Wright v. CentralDuPageHospitalAssociation.83
Wright held "that limiting recovery only in medical malpractice
action to $50,000 was arbitrary ...and constitutes a special law
in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the 1970 Constitution." '
In reaching this decision the Illinois court was faced with the same
dilemma as California. It had to determine whether the "loss of
recovery potential to some malpractice victims is offset by 'lower insurance premiums and lower medical care costs for all
recipients of medical care.' "" This was the proposed "societal"
quid pro quo of the medical malpractice legislation. The court
held that a malpractice victim's common law tort action could not
be abrogated by legislation without a concomitant quidpro quo,
and that this quidpro quo did not extend to the seriously injured
malpractice victim.8" Therefore, the court held the provision limiting recovery to be unconstitutional and rejected the suggestion
that the legislation offered a societal quid pro quo - some give
up their right to damages so that all could have cheaper medical
care - because the seriously injured gained nothing.87 The court
exceeded the mere rationality approach in reviewing the medical
malpractice legislation; the implication being that medical malpractice legislation, because of its tenuous effect and the interests
affected, demands a higher level of judicial scrutiny than other
social and economic legislation."
In Arneson v. Olson, 9 the North Dakota Supreme Court used
the means-focus test9" to determine whether the provision of the
state's Medical Malpractice Act limiting physician's liability91 was
arbitrary and unreasonable as no limitation of a pre-existing right
81. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 872.
82. Id. at 868 n. 238.
83. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Il. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
84. Id. at 330, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
85. Id. at 328, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
86. Id.
87. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 871.
88. Id.
89. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
90. Id. at 132-33 (The court selected this standard as it closely approximated the historical substantive due
process test.).
91. The North Dakota Medical Malpractice Act, codified as Chapter 26-40. 1, N.D.C.C., "limits the liability of a health-care provider qualifying under the Act to $300,000 for all claims arising from any one occurrence." See Id. at 128-29.
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may not be arbitrarily imposed.92 The means-focus test determines
whether equal protection is violated by the lack of "a close correspondence between statutory classifications and legislative
goals."93
The North Dakota court found that the limitations on the recovery of seriously damaged or injured victims did not promote the
legislative intent of the Medical Malpractice Act and thus violated equal protection. 9' The court rejected the societal quid pro quo
argument, where " 'loss of recovery potential to some malpractice victims is offset by "lower insurance premiums and lower
medical care costs for all recipients of medical care." [T]his quid
pro quo does not extend to the seriously injured malpractice victim.' "" The Act did not provide adequate compensation to seriously injured malpractice victims with meritorious claims" and
is therefore arbitrary and violates equal protection."
In Baptist Hospital of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Barber,9" the
Texas Appellate Court declared the portion of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act,99 which limited a hospital's malpractice liability, unconstitutional because it violated
federal equal protection laws." ° In reaching this decision the Texas
court determined that a quid pro quo did not exist between the
statute imposing disabilities upon certain classes of tort victims
and the disadvantaged class.10 1 The court relied on the ruling in
Arneson v. Olson,1 2 where the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that "the limitation of recovery does not provide adequate compensation to patients with meritorious claims; on the contrary,
it does just the opposite for the most seriously injured claimants.""'
In Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center,.e" the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas found the state's Medical Malpractice Act.. 5 unconstitutional. Because it limited general damages it violated equal
protection laws since there was no quidpro quo given by the Act."'
92. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135.
93. Id. at 134.
94. Id. at 135.

95. Id. at 136 (quoting Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 328,347 N.E.2d 736, 742
(1976)).
96. Id. at 135.
97. Id. at 136.
98. Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Tex., Inc. v. Barber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
99. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590: § 11.02 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
100. Baptist Hosp., 672 S.W.2d at 298.
101. Id. at 298.

102.
103.
104.
105.

Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
Baptist Hosp., 672 S.W.2d at 298 (quoting Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135-36).
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1976).
OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1984).

106. Simon, 3 Ohio Op. 3d at 170, 355 N.E.2d at 910.
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By analogy to the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Wright"7
the Ohio court rejected "the societal quid pro quo argument that
some must give up their rights to damages so that all can achieve
cheaper
medical care" because the seriously injured gained noth18
ing. 0
The Ohio court went further and attacked the legislature's
justification- "the alleged crisis situation existing in the health
care and medical malpractice insurance field"1" - for enacting the
provisions of the Act which established limits on recoverable
damages."' Stating that every profession or business undergoes
difficulties at one time or another, the court found it absurd that
the legislature would manipulate the law and enact legislation to
provide relief to one class, the medical profession, by depriving
another class, the victims of medical malpractice, of the equal
protection ordained by the Constitution."' As stated by the court:
[tihere is no doubt that the plethora of medical malpractice suits represents a crisis situation, not only
to the medical profession but to the insurance carriers as well, However, in this court's opinion, there
is no crisis situation, short of civil insurrection, sufficient to deprive . . . the right to seek redress
of grievances, to a dollar amount fully compensating one for his loss . . .. 2

In Jones v. State Board of Medicine"3 the Idaho Supreme Court
echoed Ohio's position. The court held that the common law right
of an individual to obtain redress for a breach of duty owed must
be "preserved even in times of economic stress concerning a great
segment of the public[.] [O]therwise, the door would be open for
the dissolution and diminution of these basic rights to the disinterest of the individual members of the public under the contention and allegations of public necessity. "14
In Brown v. Merlo,1 the California Supreme Court declared
the California Automobile Guest Statute"" unconstitutional based
on equal protection considerations.' 17 The guest statute deprived
"an injured automobile guest of any recovery for the careless driving of his host unless the injury results from the driver's willful

107. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 111.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
108. Simon, 3 Ohio Op. 3d at 170, 355 N.E.2d at 910.
109. Id.at 171, 355 N.E.2d at 911.
110. Id.at 171-72, 355 N.E.2d at 911.
111. Id.at 172, 355 N.E.2d at 911.
112. Id., 355 N.E.2d at 911-12 (emphasis added).
113. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
114. Id.at 863, 555 P.2d at 403.
115. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr 388 (1973).
116. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1971).
117. Brown, 8 Cal.3d at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
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misconduct or intoxication.""'The court concluded that the "classifications which the guest statute created between those denied
and those permitted recovery for negligently inflicted injuries do
not bear a substantial and rational relation to the statute's purposes of protecting the hospitality of the host-driver and of preventing collusive lawsuits."119 Brown used a means-focus test as did
Jones v. State Board of Medicine'. and the state interests lost to
the individual interests due to the "lack of a [substantial] relationship between the legislative classification and the declared legislative purposes."1'
In Newland v. Board of Governors, " the California Supreme
Court considered a problem arising under a section of the Education Code barring the issuance of a community college credential
"to anyone convicted of a 'sex offense.' "12 The applicable code
section had been amended to remove the bar for convicted felons, not misdemeanants."' The court found that the statutory classification which discriminated against misdemeanants lacked a
rational relationship to the legislative goals and thus denied the
misdemeanants the equal protection of the laws." 5 The court stated
that it was only required to "conduct a serious and judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the 'classification and the
legislative goals.' "12" (The same standard was espoused in the
majority opinion in Fein with far different results.)'. Thus, while
Newland expressed its formula in terms of a mere rationality standard it applied a means-focus test.
In Cooper v. Bray,'28 the California Supreme Court found the
"owner-passage" statute which barred "an automobile 'ownerpassenger,' injured in an accident, from maintaining a cause of
action against the permissive driver of his vehicle, unless the injuries resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the
driver"'29 to be unconstitutional. The court used the standard of
review set forth in Newland.
118. Id. at 863, 506 P.2d at 217, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (quoting CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1971)).
119. Id. at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (emphasis added).
120. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 871, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976).
121. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 874.
122. Newland v. Board of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 566 P.2d 254, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1977).
123. Id. at 707, 566 P.2d at 255, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
124. Id., 566 P.2d at 255, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
125. Id. at 713, 566 P.2d at 259, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
126. Id. at 711, 566 P.2d at 258, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
127. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 162-66, 695 P.2d 665, 683-84, 211 Cal. Rptr.
368, 386-87 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
128. Cooper v. Bray, 21 Cal. 3d 841, 582 P.2d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1978).
129. Id. at 846-47, 582 P.2d at 607, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
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The standard of review applied was whether after "a' "serious
and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the
[statutory] classification and the legislative goals'"," the disparate
treatment accorded by the statute is rationally related to the legislative purpose.'
The legislative purpose was, not to impose a special burden on
owner-passengers, but to equalize the treatment of ownerpassengers and other guest passengers. 13' However, subsequent
to the enactment of the "owner-guest" statute, Brown had declared
the California Automobile Guest Statute unconstitutional based
on equal protection considerations."' Since legislative purpose of
equalizing the treatment between owner-passengers and guestpassengers could not be achieved, the court held that the statute
which "'[elnacted to provide injured owner-passengers with the
same treatment accorded injured social guests,... now operates
to deny owner-passengers the legal rights enjoyed by every other
class of automobile accident victims' "' and therefore violates
the equal protection guarantees." The defendants suggested that
the purpose behind the owner-passenger legislation was to encourage owners to use care in the selection and supervision of
permissive drivers. The court stated that this was not the "[purpose] of the statute in question or that such [purpose] can rationally justify the treatment accorded by the provision.""3 5
INSTANT CASE

Fein v. PermanenteMedical Group3 . called upon the California Supreme Court to determine whether Civil Code Section
3333.2 violated the constitutional requirement of equal protection. 7 In analyzing the constitutionality of limiting noneconomic damage awards, the majority of the Supreme Court of California
began by stating that "[i]tis well established that ...the Legislature possesses broad authority to modify the scope and nature of

130. Id. at 855, 582 P.2d at 612, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 156 (quoting Newland v. Board of Governors, 19 Cal.
3d 705, 711, 566 P.2d 254, 258, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1977)).
131. Id. at 848, 582 P.2d at 608, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
132. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388.
133. Cooper v. Bray, 21 Cal. 3d 841, 855, 582 P.2d 604, 612, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148, 156 (quoting Schwabe
v. Jones, 16 Cal. 3d 514, 537, 546 P.2d 1033, 1049, 128 Cal. Rptr. 321, 337 (1976) (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting)).
134. Id., 582 P.2d at 612, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
135. id. at 851, 582 P.2d at 610, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
136. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
137. Id. at 142, 695 P.2d at 668-69, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
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such damages."" However, this legislative authority is not without
limits. Enacted legislation must be within constitutional limits,
and
of by
these
equalSupreme
protection.
"'in Reed v. Reed: t
Asone
stated
the limits
United isStates
Court
Equal Protection... den[ies] to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to
persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
of difference having a fair and substantial relation
141
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'

The question, therefore, is whether equal protection is violated by a lack of correspondence between statutory classification
and legislative goals." 2 The standard of review which is used is
largely determinative of whether the classification is "invidiously discriminatory so as to be prohibited by the guarantees of equal
protection."14
For the first time "the weight of authority from other
jurisdictions'" supports the constitutional challenge."14 ' The overwhelning majority of jurisdictions which have "addressed the constitutionality of medical malpractice damage limits have invalidated
the challenged provisions." " 6 Courts have declared the damage
limit statutes unconstitutional because they violate equal protection by creating an arbitrary damage limitation "preclud[ing] only
the most seriously injured victims ... from receiving full compensation for their injuries.""'

138. Id. at 157, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382, (emphasis in original) (quoting American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 368, 683 P.2d 670, 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 677 (1984)).
139. Ameson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
140. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
141. Id. at 75-76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
142. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 134.
143. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 870, 555 P.2d 399, 410 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977).
144. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 111.2d 313, 329-30, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976);
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 944, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136
(N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 167, 355 N.E.2d 903, 906-07 (Ct.
C.P. 1976) (dictum); Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Tex., Inc. v. Barber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984), affd, 714 S.W.2d 310 (1986); cf. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 877, 555 P.2d 399,
416 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (remanded for a factual determination on whether a medical
malpractice crisis actually existed). But see Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374,400, 404 N.E.2d
585, 601 (1980).
145. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 170, 695 P.2d at 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (emphasis in original) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
146. Id. (emphasis in original).
147. Carson, 120 N.H. at 941, 424 A.2d at 836.
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While the right to recover for personal injuries is not a "'fundamental right', it is nevertheless an important substantive right."'
Therefore, the right to be indemnified against medical malpractice is "sufficiently important to require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be subjected to a more rigorousjudicial
scrutiny than allowed under the rationalbasis test."' 9 Consequently, the standard to be applied to malpractice liability limitations
is "whether the challenged classifications are reasonable and have
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 5 '
Contrary to the judicial weight of authority, however, 5 ' the
majority opinion states that the test to be applied to determine
the constitutionality of the legislation is the mere rationality test.
In citing its logic for upholding Civil Code Section 3333.2, the
majority relied heavily on American Bank & Trust Company v.
Community Hospital,' in which the periodic payment of damage
provision of Civil Code Section 3333.2 was under attack as violating the state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection by limiting the provision to medical malpractice cases."'
The Supreme Court of California held that it was "not the
judiciary's function ... to reweigh the legislative facts underlying a legislative enactment."' 54 "So long as the measure is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, policy determinations
as to the need for, and desirability of, the enactment are for the
Legislature."' The court was not concerned that the legislature
did not have a grasp as to the cause of the medical malpractice
crisis or the means which would cure the crisis.56 It was sufficient merely that the legislature had enacted legislation with the
goal of reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance," 7 not
that the legislation in fact would accomplish the goals. The court
held that the "constitutionality of a measure under the equal protection clause does not depend on a court's assessment of the empirical success or failure of the measure's provisions. " "'
The majority in Fein recognized that the periodic payment measure found in American Bank differs from the limiting of noneco148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 931-32, 424 A.2d at 830 (citations omitted).

Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830 (emphasis added).
Id. at 932-33, 424 A.2d at 831 (emphasis added).
See supra note 144.
36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
Id. at 364, 379, 683 P.2d at 672, 677, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 673, 678.
Id. at 372, 683 P.2d at 678, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
Id. at 369, 683 P.2d at 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
Id. at 372-73, 683 P.2d at 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
Id. at 374, 683 P.2d at 679, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
158. Id.
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nomic awards found in Civil Code Section 3333.2, as periodic
payments simply postpone a medical malpractice victim's receipt
of damages whereas Civil Code Section 3333.2 denies complete
recovery to such victims."5 9 That difference did not alter the majority's holding that the standard of review of mere rationality was
applicable in Fein. However, Chief Justice Bird distinguished between the two cases by pointing out in her dissent that American
Bank was concerned with "windfall"profitswhile Civil Code Section 3333.2 "deniesseverely injuredmalpracticevictims compensation for negligently inflicted harm. "160
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.'61 was the only decision
cited by the majority upholding a limit on medical malpractice
damages.6' By relying on the mere rationality test used by the
Indiana Supreme Court in deciding the constitutionality of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, 6" the majority completely ignored
the overwhelming judicial weight to the contrary. 6 '
By using the mere rationality test, the Indiana court "accord[ed]
this Act with every reasonable presumption " "' as to the underlying constitutionality of the statute.1" It placed the burden of proving
that there was "no correlation between the limitation upon recovery and the promotion of healthy care" 7 upon the party challenging
its constitutionality.6' The court therefore concluded that the state
had a rational belief that by limiting recovery on medical malpractice claims the insurance crisis would be alleviated. 6 9 In Johnson, the court held that legislation is not unconstitutional simply
because it is ineffectual." ° It is enough that the legislation exists
to correct some societal "evil."171 The "evil" the Act intended to
correct was the medical malpractice crisis in Indiana. The court
took the position that, for constitutional purposes, whether the
statute eliminated the crisis was of no concern for the court.72
159. Fein, 38 Cal.3d at 158, 695 P.2d at 679-80, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
160. Id. at 169-70, 695 P.2d at 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
161. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
162. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 172 & n.3, 695 P.2d at 689-90 & n.3, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 & n.3 (three-justice
plurality did not decide the constitutional questions when upholding damage limit in Prendergast v. Nelson,
199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977)) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
163. IN . CoDE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2(c) (Burns 1983).
164. See supra note 144.
165. Johnson, 273 Ind. at 381, 404 N.E.2d at 591.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 398, 404 N.E.2d at 600.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 399-400, 404 N.E.2d at 601.
170. Id. at 381-82, 404 N.E.2d at 591.
171. Id. at 387, 404 N.E.2d at 594.
172. Id. at 399, 404 N.E.2d at 601.
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The dissent in Fein pointed out the fallacy of allowing legislatures such great "deference" when deciding constitutional issues.
The fallacy is that such "'deference' serves only to perpetuate fundamentally unjust statutory schemes."""
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act" did more, however, than
just limit health care providers' liability for negligent conduct to
$100,000 per occurrence. 75 As pointed out by Chief Justice Bird
in her dissent, in order to obtain the benefits of the $100,000 limit,
health care providers were required to contribute to a state-run
compensation fund. 7 ' When judgments in favor of medical malpractice victims exceeded the $100,000 liability limit of health
care providers, the remaining award up to a total recovery of
$500,000, would be paid to the victim from this fund. 7" Thus
the elimination inflicted on medical malpractice victims was linked
to an actual public benefit, which is not found in Civil Code Section 3333.2 limitations. "Insurers and health care providers are
free to retain any savings for private use. "178
Even if the Indiana court had adopted a means-focus test which
scrutinized the means by which the challenged legislation is said
to accomplish its articulated purpose,179 it is possible that the particular case of Johnson18 ° could have survived such scrutiny. The
Indiana court alluded to evidence in the court's record supporting
the fact that "the Act with its limitation upon recovery [was] achieving its intended goal."18 There is no such supporting data in the
case of Fein. ' There is no evidence "that the immense sacrifices
of victims [of medical malpractice results] in appreciable savings
to the insurance companies.""' Thus, Civil Code Section 3333.2
would fail such scrutiny. In Jones v. State Board of Medicine8
there was also no evidentiary basis presented to support "the relationship between the limitations [on recovery] created by the [Idaho
Hospital-Medical Liability] Act.. 5 and the abatement of the alleged
173. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 169, 695 P.2d at 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (Bird, C., dissenting).
174. INo. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2(c) (Bums 1983).
175. Johnson, 273 Ind. at 394, 404 N.E.2d at 598.
176. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 172, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (Bird, C., dissenting).
177. Johnson, 273 Ind. at 394, 404 N.E.2d at 598.
178. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 172, 695 P.2d at 690. 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (emphasis added) (Bird, C., dissenting).
179. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 871, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977).
180. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
181. Id. at 396, 404 N.E.2d at 599.
182. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 172, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (Bird, C.. dissenting).
183. Id.
184. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
185. IDAHO CODE tit. 39, Ch. 42 (1975) (repealed 1975).
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crisis."" 6 In this instance, the Idaho Supreme Court did not rule
on the constitutionality of the Act. Rather, the decision was
reversed and remanded to determine whether the means adopted
in the Idaho Act related to alleviating a genuine medical malpractice crisis."18"
In justifying placing the economic burden on the seriously injured by its recovery limitation to eliminate the crisis for society
as a whole, the Indiana court in Johnson... relied on the parallels
between the Indiana Malpractice Act and the Price-Anderson Act
involved in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
189
Group, Inc.
Both involved the lack of an effective risk spreading device for a private industry and a public need
to have the industry provide its services. Both involved a private industry which was reluctant to provide its services because of the shortage of effective insurances [sic] for the risks attendant to production. [B]oth ... established a form of government sponsored insurance, set limitations upon liability,
and placed the burden of the limitation upon persons injured by the industry. 19 0

It is particularly important, however, to note here that Justice
Byron White based his dissent on the refusal to hear Fein on the
unresolved issue in Duke Power Co.191 The unresolved issue is
whether "Due Process requires a legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common law . . . it
replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be."19 Therefore, even
with the public benefit found in Johnson, the quid pro quo of the
statute, there are still questions as to the sufficiency of the public
benefits involved, and whether the limitation on recovery for victims of medical malpractice would survive a "serious and genuine
judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and legislative goals." 93

ANALYSIS

Contrary to the majority's assertions, Brown, Newland, and
Cooper do not support its use of the mere rationality test. The
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
(1977)

Jones, 97 Idaho at 872, 555 P.2d at 412.
Id. at 877, 555 P.2d at 417.
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Johnson, 273 Ind. at 395-96, 404 N.E.2d at 599.
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 106 S. Ct. 214, 215 (1985).
106 S.Ct. at 216.
Newland v. Board of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 711, 566 P.2d 254, 258, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624
(quoting Dorrough v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1974)).
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impetus of these cases is whether the establishment of the classification "is rationally related to a realistically conceivable legislative purpose." 9 "
The majority was incorrect when it stated that the jurisdictions
invalidating statutory provisions limiting damages in medical malpractice actions'95 did so because of the potential harshness of the
limits. " The courts in these various jurisdictions declared the medical malpractice legislation to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because they rejected the mere rationality review
standard. Instead, they used the more exacting means-focus test
which compared the nexus between the purpose of the enacted
legislation - and the means used to carry out this intent - limiting
the recovery for malpractice claims. "'
The courts balanced the legislative goals with the sacrifices imposed on the innocent victims of medical malpractice and in each
instance the constitutional balance has been in favor of the interests of those victims. 98 As stated by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in Carson,' "[a]lthough the statute may promote
the legislative objective of containing health care costs, the potential cost to the general public and the actual cost to many medical
malpractice plaintiffs is simply too high.""°' While none of these
opinions is binding on the California Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Bird is justified in giving these cases careful consideration, particularly as the majority opinion was only able to cite the single
decision of Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. ,' upholding
the limit on medical malpractice damages.
A stronger rationale for following the stricter standard of review
regarding the medical malpractice litigation is supplied by the
California courts themselves in Brown, "' Newland,' and Coopt30 All three required that legislative classifications bear a fair
er.'
and substantial relationship to a legitimate purpose." The requirement was specific. The means must achieve the goals. It is not
enough that the legislation "might tend to serve some conceiva194. Cooper v. Bray, 21 Cal. 3d 841, 855, 582 P.2d 604, 612, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148, 156 (1978).
195. See supra note 144.
196. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 161, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
197. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 867, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (1976).
198. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 880.
199. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
200. Id. at 940-41, 424 A.2d at 836.
201. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
202. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
203. Newland v. Board of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 566 P.2d 254, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1977).
204. Cooper v. Bray, 21 Cal. 3d 841, 582 P.2d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1978).
205. Cooper, 21 Cal. 3d at 855, 582 P.2d at 612, 148 Cal. Rptr. at156; Newland, 19 Cal. 3d at 711, 566
P.2d at 257-58, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 623-24; Brown, 8 Cal. 3d at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
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ble legislative purpose"" as was touted by the majority in Fein.
The majority further argues that the damage limit of Civil Code
Section 3333.2 is valid as a means of lowering medical malpractice costs because the legislature "placedno limits whatsoever on
a plaintiffs right to recover for all of the economic, pecuniary
damages-such as medical expenses or lost earnings-resulting
from the injury, but instead confined the statutory limitations to
the recovery of noneconomic damages."" The majority is deliberately ignoring the complete purpose of damage awards which is
to compensate innocent victims for losses incurred through the
harm inflicted by another's actions. "The legal theory behind an
award for pain and suffering[" ] is that such pain and suffering
is as much a loss proximately caused by the tortfeasor as are economic damages, and therefore should be compensated."" Recovery of only a limited portion of noneconomic damage awards
"cannot be equivalent to recovery of the damages in full.""'0 "The
burden on medical malpractice victims is no less real" when it
is the noneconomic injury which is uncompensated. 11 "For poor
plaintiffs, noneconomic damages can provide the principal source
of compensation for reduced lifespan [sic] or loss of physical capacity."212
An innocent victim of medical malpractice "gains" nothing from
an award for economic loss."' Such awards merely replace that
which he has actually lost.2"' An award for noneconomic damage
is the only award "above the out-of-pocket loss that is available
to compensate in some way for the pain, suffering, physical impairment or disfigurement that the victim must endure until
death."... As stated by Chief Justice Bird: "[flor a child who has
been paralyzed from the neck down, the only compensation for
a lifetime without play comes from noneconomic damages. Similarly, a person who been hideously disfigured receives only
noneconomic damages to ameliorate the resulting humiliation and
embarrassment."216
206. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 162-63, 695 P.2d at 683-84, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
207. Id. at 159, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (emphasis in original).
208. Walker & Shaffer, Constitutionality, supra note 28, at 54 & n.113.
209. Id. at 54.
210. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 943, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980) (citing dissent in Opinion of the
Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 215, 304 A.2d 881, 888 (1973)).
dissenting).
211. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 171, 695 P.2d at 689, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (Bird, C.J.,
212. Id.
213. Carson, 120 N.H. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 171, 695 P.2d at 689, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (Bird, C., dissenting).
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The majority is correct when it asserts that there are "inherent
difficulties in placing a monetary value on [noneconomic] losses"2 17 because there is no mathematical formula used in computing such damages.218 However, if the court finds a verdict
excessive, a remittitur is always available to control excessive jury
awards. 219
In embracing the jurisdictions which have invalidated medical
malpractice damage limits 20 and the equal protection tests in the
California courts, Chief Justice Bird has abandoned the doubts
she expressed in her concurring opinion in Hawkins v. Superior
Court 21' regarding such means-focus tests. Her concern today is
that "the present limit is not linked to any public benefit."222 It
is not enough that the legislation "might tend to serve some conceivable legislative purpose"' as was touted by the majority.
Whether Civil Code Section 3333.2 can be "justified as a reasonable measure in furtherance of the public interest depends upon
whether the restriction of private rights sought to be imposed is
not so serious that it outweighs the benefits sought to be conferred
upon the general public.""2' In reaching this decision courts are
"freeto grant individuals more rights than the Federal Constitution requires."25
The goal of Civil Code § 3333.2 is to "reduce malpractice insurance rates by providing that insurers will not be required to
compensate [malpractice victims] whose noneconomic damages
exceed $250,000. ' 12' However, "the necessary relationship between the legislative goal of rate reduction and the means chosen
to attain that goal is weak for two reasons:" ' 7
"First, paid-out damage awards constitute only a small part of
total insurance premium costs." 2 8 "[T]he amount of each premium dollar actually awarded to the patient . . . may range from
sixteen to thirty-eight cents. . . . Therefore, even a wholesale
reduction of injured patient's recoveries [sic] recoveries will have

217. Id. at 159, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
218. Carson, 120 N.H. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 144.
221. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 607-10, 586 P.2d 916,931-33, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435,450-52
(1978).
222. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 172, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 174, 695 P.2d at 692, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
224. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 933, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980).
225. Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 831 (emphasis added).
226. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 951.
227. Carson, 120 N.H. at 941, 424 A.2d at 836.
228. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 951.
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a surprisingly limited impact on premium costs." '29 "Second, and
of primary importance, few individuals suffer noneconomic
damages in excess of $250,000. ""3' As stated in Jones, "[tihe HEW
report found in 1970 that the median recovery was $3,000 and
'less than 1% of all cases closed (in 1970) were for amounts in
excess of $100,000.' ,231
The effect of Civil Code Section 3333.2 is to place the burden
to reduce the level of malpractice insurance premiums "on those
extremely unfortunate victims who most need financial protection." 32 "[Miost large recoveries come in cases involving permanent damage to infants or to young, previously healthy adults.
Spreadout over the expected lifetime of a young person, $250,000
shrinks to insignificance."233
When the California Legislature enacted Civil Code Section
3333.2, it had "no evidence that the immense sacrifices of victims would result in appreciable savings to the insurance companies." 234 "In the years preceding the enactment of [the statute],
an insignificant number of individuals (at maximum, 14 in a single year) received compensation of over $250,000 in noneconomic
and economic damages combined. "23' Faced with the aforementioned facts, Chief Justice Bird could only conclude that since Civil
Code Section 3333.2 is unconstitutional there was "no rational
basis for singling out the most severely injured victims of medical negligence to pay for special relief to health care providers
and their insurers. ,36
The question remains whether Civil Code Section 3333.2 accomplished its purpose: by providing that insurers would not have
to compensate malpractice victims whose damages exceeded
$250,000, malpractice insurance premiums would be reduced and
an adequate supply of health care providers would be available.
If these goals have been accomplished then obviously the legisla229. Id. at 941.
230. Id. at 951.
231. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine 97 Idaho 859, 875, 555 P.2d 399, 415 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977) (quoting U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare Report to the Secretary's Commission on
Medical Malpractice 33 (1973)).
2d 313, 325, 347 N.E,2d 736, 741 (1976). See Note,
232. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n., 63 nll.
Challenge, supra note 24, at 953 ("these individuals are also much less politically powerful than all malpractice
victims .... or the class of all tort victims").
233.
234.
235.
236.

dissenting).
Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 171, 695 P.2d at 689, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (emphasis added) (Bird, C.J.,
Id. at 172, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (emphasis in original) (Bird, C.., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis in original).
dissenting).
Id. at 175, 695 P.2d at 692, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (Bird, C.J.,
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tion and its subsequent classifications had a substantial relation
to the achievement of the objective. The legislation would have
passed the means-focus test and would thus be constitutional.

CONCLUSION -

CALIFORNIA TODAY

Over a decade has passed since the enactment of MICRA and
Civil Code Section 3333.2. The aspirations of MICRA have never
been realized. 7 The rapidly increasing medical malpractice premiums were the primary target of MICRA, and the price of these
premiums is increasing approximately fifteen percent annually. "38
The number of malpractice cases dropped sharply, initially, but
quickly rebounded. In 1979, one malpractice insurer in California had eight claims per 100 physicians insured. By 1983 it was
17 per 100 physicians.239 In reaction to the increase in malpractice suits, some physicians are attempting to screen their patients
for proclivities toward suing. " '
The reduction in damage recovery has made it difficult for victims of medical malpractice to find legal representation. It costs
an attorney $25,000 to $50,000 to prepare a medical malpractice
case properly ."1 Eighty percent of all medical malpractice claims
are resolved infavor of doctors and their insurers.2 " The combination of initial out-of-pocket expenses, a twenty percent chance
of recovery, and the reduction in contingency fees " ' amounts to

237. In fact, doctors say things have not changed very much in the last 10 years. Rodarmor, The Other Side
of Medical Malpractice, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1986, at 38.
238. "Doctors still say they are being forced to turn away high-risk patients or to abandon practice entirely,
which is what they said in 1975." Obstetricians have been hardest hit, along with a few other high-risk medical
specialists. The premium for malpractice insurance of obstetricians continues to increase by 25 percent per
year. The actuaries have capped the increase at 25 percent, but the losses are actually higher. In Los Angeles,
obstetricians pay between $35,720 and $61,052 for malpractice insurance, and the cost is still increasing. "Thus
a doctor who delivers one baby a week must add between $685 and $1,175 to the cost of each birth ... "
[Mlalpractice claims have been filed against over half of the state's OB's and 28.5 percent of them are thinking
of reducing or eliminating deliveries from their practices." Id. at 39-40. See also Doctors and Lawyers Face
Off A.B.A.J., July 1, 1986, at 39 (a recent poll shows the price of premiums leads to an early retirement
for 27 percent of the doctors in the United States).
239. Rodarmor, supra note 237, at 39.
240. Sky-high Damage Suits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 27, 1986, at 37 ("In Los Angeles, some now
use a computerized service called Physician's Alert to identify patients who have filed malpractice claims.").
241. Rodarmor, supra note 237, at 41.
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 40-41.
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a risk-benefit ratio which is too low for most attorneys. 2"'
Litigants for malpractice claims will have great difficulty in finding competent attorneys to represent them because attorneys will
be reluctant to undertake a malpractice case for the following
reasons:
1) The cost to the attorney ranging from $25,000-$50,000
to prepare a case for trial." '
2) A twenty percent chance of recovering anything through
contingency fees. "'
3) The reduction of contingency fees pro-rated to the size
of the award. The attorney, should the case be won,
would receive :247
40% of the first $50,000;
33% of the next $50,000;
25% of the next $100,000; and
10% of anything over $200,000.
In order for an attorney to recover his own expenses, the recoveries would have to be quite substantial. The average restitution
nationally is $80,000.. with over two-thirds of all cases averaging $50,000 or less. A $50,000 award would yield $20,000 (less
than the cost of preparation). A $100,000 award would yield
$36,500 ($20,000 on the first $50,000; $16,500 on the second
$50,000).
Perhaps still not enough to recover costs, a $200,000 award
would yield fees of $61,500. If the cost to a law firm were $50,000
to prepare a case for trial, the award would, of necessity, have
to be $200,000 for recovery of fees plus a profit of $11,500. This
amount of money is insignificant, especially as it would normally have the additional disadvantage of tying up the firm in litigation over several years. The more seriously injured the patient,
the less likely an attorney would be to take the case because of
no hope of recovery from a permanently injured litigant unless
the case was won.
When the California Legislature enacted MICRA, it overlooked
the most obvious and important cause of the medical malpractice
crisis, which was "the substantial number of injuries and other
adverse results sustainedby patients during the course of hospital and medical treatment."2 "9 The most alarming part of the situ244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40-41.
Id.
Wagner, At the Core: The Patient, TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 44, 45 (emphasis in original).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 7:61

ation is that the repeat offenders appear to be practicing unchecked
by the medical community. "'
Doctors said fear of malpractice claims has led to practicing
"defensive medicine,"2"1 resulting in increased costs to the pub-

lic. 2 In a response to an American Medical News poll, twentyseven percent of the doctors responding said they had begun to
provide additional treatment procedures and forty-five percent said
they were referring more patients to specialists and other consultants.23

Defensive medicine has been defined as "keeping more
meticulous records, studying professional literature more regularly, attending more continuing education programs and calling
in specialists for second opinions when high-risk procedures seem
needed."" 4 However, critics of tort changes argue that "[d]octors
are just being forced to practice good medicine to avoid malpractice" and that these procedures should be a standard procedure."'
The purpose of Civil Code Section 3333.2 was to reduce insurance rates by limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000 or
less," 6 but the expected benefits of MICRA have never been realized.25 The situation in California is no better today than before

the passage of MICRA. Therefore, under the means-focus test,
MICRA is unconstitutional since the legislation has failed to
achieve its objective of reducing malpractice insurance rates. The
majority contemplated various legislative purposes to justify Civil
Code Section 3333.2 rather than the actual purpose of the statute, " ' and thus upheld as constitutional a hasty and ill-advised
law which is not truly in the public interest."'
Candace Lynnette Hall

250. Sky-High Damage Suits, supra note 240, at 37 (emphasis in original).
251. Doctors and Lawyers Face Off, supra note 238, at40.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. ld. at 40-41.
255. Wecht, Medicine: A Commercial Enterprise, TIAL, May/June 1975, at39, 40.
256. Note, Challenge, supra note 24, at 951.
257. Id. at 846 n. 102.
258. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 160& n. 17, 695 P.2d at 681 & n. 17, 211 Cal, Rptr. at 384 & n.17 ('The arguments
in favor of limiting non-economic loss are that a ceiling on general damages would contain jury awards within
realistic limits, reduce the exposure of insurers, . . . lead to more settlements and less litigation, and enable
insurance companies to set more accurate rates because of the size of judgments.").
259, See Frink, supra note 4, at 32.

